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Since the late 1970s, major federal workforce development pro-
grams in the United States have included performance management 
systems that assess how well the programs are performing at the na-
tional, state, and local levels. The use of performance management in 
workforce programs predates the more general congressionally man-
dated performance requirements of the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA). This chapter draws on the previous work of the 
author and others in assessing the lessons of the past 30 years of experi-
ence with performance management in workforce programs. Although 
the chapter focuses on the U.S. system, the lessons should apply to 
programs in other countries as well. 
The chapter fi rst discusses what performance management is in the 
context of workforce programs. Next, performance management is con-
trasted and compared with program evaluations. Policy offi cials would 
like to implement performance measures that are based on program im-
pact; the next section describes why that is generally not possible to 
do and presents empirical fi ndings on the success of such efforts. The 
following section describes how the performance management system 
used for U.S. workforce programs can lead to unintended results and 
summarizes some of the research on this topic. This is followed by a 
discussion of whether standards should be absolute or adjusted for fac-
tors such as participant characteristics and economic conditions. The 
fi nal section presents lessons for countries that are considering estab-
lishing a performance management system.
Although related, the concepts of performance measurement and 
evaluation are distinct and serve different purposes (see Blalock and 
Barnow [2001]). Performance measurement is a management tool that 
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is used to monitor implementation on a real-time basis. Performance 
measures may track data that indicate fi delity in program implemen-
tation, inputs (such as participant characteristics) that are considered 
important to the program’s purpose, process measures (e.g., use of “best 
practices”), outputs expected from the program, and sometimes short-
term gross outcome measures. Program evaluation, on the other hand, is 
intended to answer specifi c questions about programs. Process studies 
document what happened while the program was implemented, impact 
evaluations assess what difference in outcome measures was due to the 
intervention, and cost-benefi t analyses assess whether the benefi ts of a 
program exceed the costs. 
If the program has limited capacity, participant characteristics may 
be a useful performance measure, and one or more measures could be 
established to track the characteristics of customers served.1 Process 
measures rather than output or outcome measures are sometimes used. 
For example, if particular practices are known to be more effective or 
less expensive than the alternatives, a case can be made for including 
process measures of performance. In the current health care reform de-
bate in the United States, some advocates argue that costs can be driven 
down by requiring providers to use best practices or by providing fi -
nancial incentives to do so; similar arguments can be raised in setting 
standards for education. In the past, however, some in the workforce 
fi eld have argued that so long as the grant recipients are held account-
able for the desired results, they should be free to adopt the approach 
they believe is best rather than relying on processes prescribed by the 
federal government.2 A reasonable approach might be to monitor use of 
best practices and provide technical assistance, rewards, and sanctions 
only when an organization fails to achieve satisfactory outcomes.
In a system characterized by delegation of authority from the central 
government to lower levels of government (state and local government 
for many U.S. programs, but the concepts apply to a system of grantees 
or for-profi t contractors as well), the goals of the level of government 
providing the funds may not be aligned with the goals of the level of 
government providing the services. By instituting a performance man-
agement system that provides rewards and sanctions based on how well 
the lower level of government meets the goals of the funding agency, 
the so-called principal-agent problem can be (in theory) resolved.
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The differences between performance measurement and evalua-
tion often are matters of depth of analysis and causality. Because of the 
need for rapid feedback, performance measurement activities generally 
track easy-to-collect data on inputs, activities, and outputs. Data for 
performance measurement generally come from management infor-
mation systems maintained by the programs and from administrative 
data collected for other purposes.3 Evaluations are usually conducted 
less often and with greater resources; a process study, for example, can 
make use of extensive interviews to document program implementa-
tion. Performance management activities cannot usually afford the time 
and resources required for tracking long-term outcomes and establish-
ing and tracking a control group or comparison group, so performance 
measures are usually based on gross postprogram measures (such as 
earnings during a postprogram period), while evaluations can estimate 
program impact (by, for example, comparing earnings of participants af-
ter participation with earnings of a control group of applicants that was 
excluded from the program through random assignment). For example, 
performance measures for a vocational training program can include 
placement rates, wages at placement, and perhaps short-term follow-up 
measures of employment and earnings for participants, but an impact 
evaluation will focus on the change in employment and earnings due 
to the program, usually for a signifi cantly longer period. Both types of 
activities are important for management and policy development, but, 
as discussed below, one should avoid reading more into performance 
results than is actually there.
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FOR U.S. WORKFORCE 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
In the United States, implementation of GPRA has led various 
programs to embrace alternative concepts of why performance man-
agement is useful. According to the statute, GPRA was designed to hold 
“federal agencies accountable for achieving program results.” In partic-
ular, GPRA requires that agencies develop performance measures and 
standards for the programs they administer, as well as strategic plans to 
achieve their goals. 
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A performance management system must include three components: 
1) measures of performance, 2) standards for acceptable performance, 
and 3) feedback on performance. As discussed below, measures for 
U.S. workforce programs have attempted to focus on program impacts, 
but that need not be the case. 
The USDOL established performance measures long before such 
measures were mandated under GPRA. Performance measures were 
fi rst established in the late 1970s for CETA. JTPA, which was the major 
national workforce program in the 1980s and 1990s, had statutory pro-
visions calling for measuring performance as the impact of the program 
on employment and earnings relative to program cost.4 Specifi cally, 
Section 106 of JTPA, which provided the requirements for performance 
standards, stated 
The Congress recognizes that job training is an investment in hu-
man capital and not an expense. In orde r to determine whether that 
investment has been productive, Congress fi nds that it is essential 
that criteria for measuring the return on this investment be devel-
oped; and that the basic return on investment is to be measured by 
long-term economic self-suffi ciency, increased employment and 
earnings, reductions in welfare dependency, and increased educa-
tional attainment and occupational skills. 
The JTPA statute suggested but did not require that measures for 
adults include the employment rate in unsubsidized employment, em-
ployment retention for six months, an increase in earnings and/or the 
wage rate, a reduction in welfare dependency, and acquisition of skills. 
In practice, the performance measures used for JTPA were primarily 
program outcomes that, at best, served as proxies for program impact. 
Initially, the measures focused on the status of participants at the time of 
exit from the program or shortly thereafter, but by the time the program 
was replaced by WIA, a follow-up period of 13 weeks was used for 
most measures. The statute originally also called for cost measures, but 
as described below, this requirement was repealed in 1992.5  
Under WIA, the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
advocated that all programs with a workforce goal have “common mea-
sures,” but agencies other than the USDOL have resisted adopting the 
common measures. Currently, the common measures for adults and dis-
located workers are:
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• Entered employment rate: Of those not employed at the date of 
participation, the number of participants who are employed in 
the fi rst quarter after the exit quarter divided by the number of 
participants who exited during the quarter.
• Employment retention rate: Of those who are employed in the 
fi rst quarter after the exit quarter, the number of participants who 
are employed in both the second and third quarters after the exit 
quarter divided by the number of participants who exited during 
the quarter.
• Average earnings: Of those participants who are employed in 
the fi rst, second, and third quarters after the exit quarter, total 
earnings in the second quarter plus total earnings in the third 
quarter divided by the number of participants who exited during 
the quarter.6
For Youth programs, the common measures use a broader concept 
of a successful outcome by including training and education, and the 
measures include attainment of a certifi cate or degree and literacy and 
numeracy gains.
ADJUSTMENTS TO PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
U.S. workforce investment programs have varied in their approach 
to adjusting performance standards, both among programs and over 
time. This section fi rst describes how performance standards have been 
adjusted for major U.S. workforce investment programs and then sum-
marizes the pros and cons of adjusting standards.7
For the primary workforce investment programs administered by 
the USDOL, JTPA in the 1980s and 1990s, and WIA beginning in 2000, 
state and local area standards were subject to adjustment, but the ap-
proach has varied greatly. Initially under JTPA, governors had three 
options for adjusting standards for the service delivery areas (SDAs) 
within their jurisdiction: using the national standards established by 
the Secretary of Labor, using regression models developed by the 
USDOL to adjust standards for variation in participant characteristics 
and economic conditions, or developing their own adjustment system. 
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The legislation was later amended to make it relatively diffi cult for gov-
ernors to use any adjustment mechanism other than the national model. 
Under WIA, standards were established at the state level through nego-
tiations, although some have commented that USDOL offi cials imposed 
standards on the states with no opportunity to truly negotiate; states can 
determine local workforce area standards in any manner they choose.8 
Although many public programs, including all that are administered 
by federal agencies, are required to establish performance standards, 
there are few cases where adjustments to performance standards have 
been considered, and even fewer where they have actually been applied. 
The concepts of fairness and equity have been set forth to argue both 
for and against the use of performance adjustments. The most oft-cited 
reason for adjusting standards is to “level the playing fi eld,” or to make 
performance management systems as fair as possible by establishing 
expectations that take account of different demographic, economic, and 
other conditions or circumstances outside of public managers’ control 
that infl uence performance. It has also been argued, however, that it is 
not acceptable to set lower expectations for some programs than others, 
even if they serve more disadvantaged populations or operate in more 
diffi cult circumstances. For example, do we perpetuate inequities in ed-
ucation if less rigorous standards for reading and math performance are 
established for schools serving poorer children? Or if a single standard 
is set for all, could governments instead direct more resources to those 
programs that face more diffi cult conditions or disadvantaged popula-
tions to help put them on a more level playing fi eld? 
Another argument of those advocating adjustments to performance 
standards is that they better approximate the value added of programs 
(rather than gross outcome levels or change). For policymakers or pro-
gram managers, having a better understanding of the contributions of 
program activities to performance (net of factors that are not infl uenced 
by the production or service processes) may contribute to more effective 
use of the performance information to improve program operations and 
management. The use of adjusted performance measures is also more 
likely to discourage (if not eliminate) “gaming” responses, in which 
program managers attempt to infl uence measured performance in ways 
that do not increase impacts (e.g., by altering who is served and how). 
A system that adjusts for population characteristics and other such fac-
tors will reduce the effi cacy of these gaming strategies and the misspent 
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effort and resources associated with them. As described below, there is 
ample evidence that workforce investment programs have responded to 
performance management systems by cream skimming from the pool 
of eligible individuals.
Of course, these benefi ts may be contingent on program managers 
understanding and having confi dence in the adjustment mechanisms. 
Regression-based performance adjustment models have been criticized 
for having low explanatory power (as measured by R2) and fl awed 
specifi cations, suggesting that sometimes adjustments may be biased 
or unreliable. The argument that a low R2 implies that the statistical 
model is not useful is in most cases false. A low R2 means that there is 
a lot of noise in predicting the overall level of the dependent variable, 
not necessarily that the estimates of the effects of specifi c explanatory 
variables are unreliable. Indeed, one may obtain statistically signifi cant 
coeffi cients for the adjustment factors even with a low R2, implying that 
there are important factors that have a strong effect on predicted perfor-
mance and should be accounted for in measuring performance. 
While there are merits in the arguments both for and against the 
use of performance adjustments, few public programs appear to even 
consider or attempt to develop adjustments for performance standards. 
Until more experimentation with performance adjustments takes place 
in public programs, we will continue to be limited in our ability to 
understand not only whether they have the potential to improve the ac-
curacy of our performance assessments, but also if they contribute to 
improved performance over time as public managers receive more use-
ful feedback about their programs’ achievements (or failures) and what 
contributes to them. 
In their assessment of adjusting performance standards, Barnow 
and Heinrich (2010) conclude with the following recommendations. 
First, policymakers and program managers should, at a minimum, give 
more consideration to the concept of adjusting performance standards. 
Specifi cally, programs should ask if they can make a strong case for 
having the same standard for all jurisdictions or entities regardless of 
the context or circumstances in which they operate. Second, statistical 
modeling should be viewed as one tool in the adjustment process (and 
not the only technique to be applied). There is no single approach to sta-
tistical modeling or to combining statistical analysis with other methods 
such as negotiation or subgroup performance analysis that will work 
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best for all programs. In fact, Barnow and Heinrich (2010) suggest that 
statistical modeling should be viewed as a complement rather than a 
substitute for negotiating performance standards. In Washington State, 
for example, statistical models are a starting point for negotiations of 
local WIA performance standards, and at the national level, the USDOL 
is now providing guidance on how changes in circumstances (such as 
the unemployment rate) can affect outcomes. Likewise, if regression 
models produce counterintuitive fi ndings or fi ndings that are contrary 
to other policies of interest, the models, data, and time frame should be 
investigated and refi ned accordingly or discarded. Finally, the use of 
statistical modeling for performance adjustments does not negate the 
use of other incentives for guiding program managers or the incorpora-
tion of other performance management system features or requirements 
such as “continuous performance improvement.” 
EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN WORKFORCE INVESTMENT PROGRAMS
The ETA has had substantial experience with performance stan-
dards, and a number of studies have been conducted on the impacts of 
performance management on participants served, activities, costs, and 
program impacts. While most analysts note the strong rationale for de-
veloping performance measures for government programs, there has 
been considerable controversy in the literature regarding the benefi ts 
of performance management systems, particularly as they have been 
applied since enactment of the GPRA in 1993. This section of the re-
port reviews the literature on performance standards for workforce 
programs; most of the research was conducted on the performance stan-
dards system used under JTPA, WIA’s predecessor.9 Although much of 
the literature on performance management points to its salutary effects, 
there is little doubt from the literature that instituting performance stan-
dards can have a strong impact on program behavior, and not always in 
the desired direction. This section summarizes the literature on perfor-
mance standards in employment and training programs in fi ve key areas: 
1) the impact of performance standards on who is served, 2) the impact 
of performance standards on the services provided, 3) the relationship 
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between performance measures and program impacts, 4) strategic re-
sponses by state and local programs to performance standards, and 
5) lessons learned by the ETA and states/localities on the use and effects 
of effi ciency measures/standards.
The Impact of Performance Standards on Who Is Served
The majority of the employment and training literature on perfor-
mance incentives addresses the question of their effect on who gets 
served. Under JTPA, local SDAs had strong incentives to serve persons 
likely to have good labor market outcomes, regardless of whether those 
outcomes were due to JTPA because the performance measures used 
focused on postprogram levels of employment and earnings. Similar 
incentives guide the WIA program. In fact, the absence of a regression 
model to adjust standards for serving individuals with labor market bar-
riers should make these incentives stronger under WIA than they were 
under JTPA. 
The literature divides this issue into two parts. First, do SDAs 
(called WIBs under WIA) respond to these incentives by differentially 
serving persons likely to have good outcomes, whether or not those 
good outcomes result from the effects of the program? This is the litera-
ture on “cream skimming.” Second, if there is cream skimming, what 
are its impact effects? Taking the best among the eligible could be eco-
nomically effi cient if the types of services offered by these programs 
have their largest net impacts for this group. In what follows, the litera-
ture on each of these two questions is reviewed.
Do employment and training programs cream skim?
Several papers examine whether or not JTPA program staff cream 
skimmed in response to the incentives provided by the JTPA perfor-
mance system. The key issue in this literature is the counterfactual: to 
what group of nonparticipants should the participants be compared in 
order to determine whether or not cream skimming has occurred? In 
all cases, the studies proceed by comparing observable characteristics 
correlated with outcomes, such as education levels or participation in 
transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. A fi nding that 
participants have “better” characteristics relative to nonparticipants in 
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the form of higher mean years of schooling or lower average prepro-
gram transfer receipt, is interpreted as evidence of cream skimming.
Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond 
(1993) compare the characteristics of JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in 
1987 with the characteristics of a sample of individuals eligible for 
JTPA in the same state with data constructed from the Current Popu-
lation Survey. The literature suggests that less than 5 percent of the 
eligible population participated in JTPA in each year (see the discus-
sion in Heckman and Smith 1999), which allows wide scope for cream 
skimming. Both papers fi nd modest evidence of cream skimming. In 
particular, the Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993) analysis of 
program participation and postprogram job placement suggests that if 
eligible persons participated at random, the placement rate would have 
been 61.6 percent rather than 70.7 percent, a fall of 9.1 percentage 
points.
Heckman and Smith (2004) address the issue of self-selection 
versus selection by program staff using data from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation on JTPA eligibles combined with data 
from the National JTPA Study. They break the participation process 
for JTPA into a series of stages—eligibility, awareness, application and 
acceptance, and participation—and look at the observed determinants 
of going from each stage to the next. They fi nd that some differences 
between program eligibles and participants result primarily from self-
selection at stages of the participation process, such as awareness, over 
which program staff have little or no control. The evidence in Heck-
man and Smith (2004) suggests that while cream skimming may be 
empirically relevant, comparing the eligible population as a whole to 
participants likely overstates its extent, and misses a lot of substantive 
and policy-relevant detail.
The paper by Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) presents a con-
trasting view. They use data from the Corpus Christi, Texas, SDA, the 
only SDA in the National JTPA Study for which reliable data on all 
program applicants are available for the period during the experiment. 
In their empirical work, they examine whether those applicants who 
reach random assignment (i.e., were selected to participate in the pro-
gram) differ from those who do not in terms of both predicted outcome 
levels (earnings in the 18 months after random assignment) and pre-
dicted program impacts (projected into the future and discounted). The 
Lessons from the WIA Performance Measures  219
authors fi nd strong evidence of negative selection on levels combined 
with weak evidence for positive selection on impacts. They attribute 
the former to a strong “social worker mentality” toward helping the 
hard-to-serve among the eligible that was evident in interactions with 
program staff at the Corpus Christi site. WIA offers an interesting 
contrast to JTPA because the WIA performance standards are not ad-
justed by a regression model, and they therefore do not hold programs 
harmless for the characteristics of their participants. Because programs 
now have stronger incentives to enroll individuals with few barriers to 
employment, we would expect to observe enrollment shift toward this 
group. An internal (USDOL 2002) study fi nds that this is precisely what 
appears to be occurring, at least in the area scrutinized:
A brief survey of States by our Chicago Regional Offi ce indicated 
that WIA registrations were occurring at only half the level of en-
rollment achieved by JTPA. While some of this may be due to start 
up issues, there are indications that the reduced registration levels 
are due to a reluctance in local areas to offi cially register people in 
WIA because of concerns about their ability to meet performance 
goals, especially the “earnings gain” measure. It appears that local 
areas in these States are selective in whom they will be account-
able for. Some local areas are basing their decisions to register a 
person on the likelihood of success, rather than on an individual’s 
need for services.
A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO 
2002) confi rms these problems. The GAO report, based on a survey 
of 50 states, indicated “many states reported that the need to meet per-
formance levels may be the driving factor in deciding who receives 
WIA-funded services at the local level.”
Overall, the literature provides modest evidence that program staff 
responded to the incentives provided by the JTPA performance stan-
dards system to choose participants likely to improve their measured 
performance whether or not they benefi ted from program services, and 
studies of the implementation of WIA indicate that, if anything, the sit-
uation has been exacerbated by the performance management system 
used for WIA. At the same time, the evidence from the Corpus Christi 
SDA indicates that staff concerns about serving the hard-to-serve could 
trump the performance incentives in some contexts.
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What are the impact implications of cream skimming?
A number of studies have examined the effi ciency implications of 
cream skimming by estimating the correlation between performance 
measures and program impacts. Barnow and Smith (2004) summarize 
the evidence from the seven studies that comprise this literature. The 
seven papers examine a variety of different programs, ranging from the 
MDTA program of the 1960s to the Job Corps program of today. Most 
rely on experimental data for their impact estimates. With one excep-
tion (Zornitsky et al. 1988), the fi ndings are negative or mixed regarding 
the relationship between outcome-based performance measures of the 
type typically used in employment and training programs and program 
impacts. The Zornitsky et al. fi ndings refer to a program, the AFDC 
Homemaker–Home Health Aide Demonstration, which differs from 
programs such as JTPA and WIA in that it provided a homogeneous 
treatment to a relatively homogeneous population. Taken together, the 
literature clearly indicates that, in the context of employment and train-
ing programs, commonly used performance measures do not improve 
program impact by inducing service to those who will benefi t most. At 
the same time, the literature indicates that cream skimming likely has a 
very small effect, if any, on program earnings impact.
Effects of Performance Incentives on Services Provided
At least two papers examine the effect of performance incentives on 
the types and duration of services offered in an employment and train-
ing program, holding constant the characteristics of persons served.10 
Marschke’s (2002) analysis uses the variation in performance incen-
tives facing the training centers in the National JTPA Study to identify 
the effects of performance incentives on the types of services received 
by JTPA participants. Marschke (2002) fi nds evidence that changes in 
the performance measures employed in JTPA led SDAs to alter the mix 
of services provided in ways that would improve their performance rel-
ative to the altered incentives they faced. In some cases, these changes 
led to increases in effi ciency, but in others they did not. Marschke 
(2002) interprets his evidence as indicating that SDAs’ service choices 
are responsive at the margin, but that existing performance measures 
do a poor job of capturing program goals such as maximizing the (net) 
impacts of the services provided.
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More recently, Courty and Marschke (2004) demonstrate that the 
JTPA performance management system affects the duration of train-
ing for some participants because program managers manipulate the 
duration of services for some participants in order to be able to count 
them on their performance measures for a specifi c program year. Courty 
and Marschke (2004) fi nd that these manipulations reduced the over-
all mean impact of the employment and training services provided by 
JTPA. 
Relationship between Performance Measures and Program Impact
Performance measures for a program may be of intrinsic interest, 
or they may be a proxy for some underlying factor of interest that is not 
easy to measure in a relatively quick and inexpensive manner. For ex-
ample, Blalock and Barnow (2001) note that programs may wish to use 
program impact as a performance measure, but accurately measuring 
impact requires many years and the presence of a randomly assigned 
control group or a carefully selected comparison group. Because this is 
not generally compatible with obtaining quick, inexpensive measures, 
programs often rely on proxy measures such as postprogram earnings 
or the pre-post change in earnings. If the goal is to have performance 
measures serve as a proxy for impact, then it is necessary to assess how 
well the types of measures that are practical and have been used for the 
JTPA and WIA programs correspond with program impact.
Two studies have explored this issue for JTPA in recent years, and 
another study looked at the Job Corps. Barnow (2000) and Heckman, 
Heinrich, and Smith (2002) both made use of the fact that the National 
JTPA Study provided experimental impact fi ndings in 16 local areas and 
included the data needed to construct performance measures similar to 
those used by ETA. However, the approach used to measure perfor-
mance does not include a control group or even a comparison group, 
so it is not surprising that the performance measures used are at best 
weakly correlated with program impact.11
The recent evaluation of the Job Corps that was based on a classical 
experimental design provided Schochet and Burghardt (2008) with an 
opportunity to analyze how closely the Job Corps’s performance stan-
dards track the program’s impacts. Job Corps is a primarily residential 
program for highly disadvantaged out-of-school youth. Schochet and 
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Burghardt indicate that during the evaluation period, program years 
1994 through 1996, the performance measures included eight mea-
sures in three broad areas: 1) program achievement (reading and math 
gains, GED attainment rate, and vocational completion rate); 2) place-
ment measures (placement rate, average wage at placement, and the 
percentage of placements related to training); and 3) quality/compli-
ance measures (ratings of federal monitors). Because of the random 
assignment used to assign treatment status, impact can be estimated 
as the difference between treatment and control group values on the 
outcome measures. Schochet and Burghardt (2008) compare program 
impacts for Job Corps centers ranked in each third of the performance 
distribution. They conclude, “Our results indicate that at the time of the 
National Job Corps Study, measured center performance was not asso-
ciated with impacts on key education, crime, and earnings outcomes.” 
Strategic Responses to Performance Incentives
In addition to the substantive responses to performance incentives 
considered above, in which local programs changed what they actually 
did, local programs can also attempt to change their measured perfor-
mance without changing their actual performance. This behavior is 
referred to as a strategic response, or as “gaming” the performance sys-
tem. Regardless of their differing goals, all types of organizations have 
an incentive to respond strategically to performance incentives, pro-
vided the cost is low, as doing so yields additional resources to further 
their own goals. The literature provides clear evidence of such gaming 
behavior under JTPA.
One important form of strategic behavior under JTPA was the ma-
nipulation of whether or not participants were formally enrolled. Under 
the JTPA incentive system (and WIA as well), only persons formally 
enrolled counted toward site performance. In addition, for the fi rst 
decade of JTPA’s existence, local programs had substantial fl exibility 
in regard to when someone became formally enrolled. Clever SDAs 
improved their performance by basing enrollments on job placements 
rather than the initiation of services. For example, some SDAs boosted 
performance by providing job search assistance without formally en-
rolling those receiving it in the program. Then, if an individual found 
a job, the person would be enrolled, counted as a placement, and ter-
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minated, all in quick succession. Similarly, SDAs would send potential 
trainees to employers to see if the employer would approve them for an 
on-the-job training slot; enrollment would not take place until a willing 
employer was found.
There are several pieces of evidence regarding the empirical impor-
tance of this phenomenon. The fi rst is indirect, and consists of the fact 
that USDOL found it enough of a problem to change the regulations. 
Specifi cally, in 1992, the USDOL required that individuals become en-
rolled once they received objective assessment and that they count as a 
participant for performance standards purposes once they received any 
substantive service, including job search assistance. 
Other evidence comes from the National JTPA Study. As part of 
their process analysis of the treatments provided at the 16 SDAs in the 
study, Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) conducted interviews of 
nonenrolled members of the experimental treatment group at 12 of the 
16 sites. These results (available in Table 3.2 of their report) show that 
53 percent of nonenrolled treatment group members received services, 
most often referrals to employers for possible on-the-job training (36 
percent of all nonenrollees) and job search assistance (20 percent of all 
nonenrollees). They report that “. . . most of the study sites enrolled in-
dividuals in classroom training when they attended their fi rst class or in 
OJT when they worked their fi rst day.” There is also evidence that this 
type of behavior has continued under WIA. The U.S. Government Ac-
countability Offi ce (2002, p. 14) notes that “all the states we visited told 
us that local areas are not registering many WIA participants, largely at-
tributing the low number of WIA participants to concerns by local staff 
about meeting performance levels.”
The fl exibility of JTPA also allowed strategic manipulation of the 
termination decision. Because performance standards in JTPA were 
based on exiters, SDAs had no incentive to terminate individuals from 
the program who were not successfully placed in a job. By keeping 
them on the rolls, the person’s lack of success would never be recog-
nized and used against the SDA in measuring its performance. As the 
USDOL explains in one of its guidance letters, “Without some policy 
on termination, performance standards create strong incentives for local 
programs to avoid terminating failures even when individuals no longer 
have any contact with the program.”12 
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Problems with local programs retaining participants on the rolls 
long after they stopped receiving services go back to the days of JTPA’s 
predecessor, CETA. In one of their guidance letters, the USDOL 
observed that “monitors and auditors found that some participants con-
tinued to be carried in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three 
years after last contact with these programs.” For Title II-A of JTPA, 
the USDOL limited the period of inactivity to 90 days, although some 
commentators suggested periods of 180 days or more.13
The ETA’s Experience with Effi ciency Measures
The ETA also has previous experience with effi ciency standards un-
der JTPA. Under the original JTPA statute, Section 106(b)(4) required 
that effi ciency measures be prescribed for the JTPA Adult Program and 
that the effi ciency measures be related to the outcome measures used. 
The National Commission for Employment Policy (NCEP) commis-
sioned an evaluation of the effects of JTPA performance standards on 
participants, services, and costs (see Dickinson et al. [1988]). The study 
included quantitative statistical analysis of JTPA Annual Status Report 
data linked to data on the characteristics of local program areas, as well 
as qualitative analysis based on interviews with 30 local programs and 
87 service providers in eight states.
For the most part, the study found that the JTPA performance 
standards had the desired effects of holding programs harmless for dif-
ferences in participant characteristics and local economic conditions. 
However, the study found that the cost standards had intrinsic problems 
and created some undesirable effects on participants served:
This evaluation found that the federal standards for the entered 
employment rate and wage rate for adults generally did not have 
unintended effects on clients or services . . . The federal cost stan-
dards, however, had the most unintended effects and were the 
least comparably measured of all the federal performance mea-
sures. The evaluation found that SDAs in states that placed more 
weight on the federal cost standard tended to serve fewer hard-
to-serve clients and that [local areas] concerned about exceeding 
the cost standards tended to design less intensive services. At the 
same time, this evaluation found serious measurement problems 
with the cost standards. We found large differences in the extent 
to which [local programs] were leveraging JTPA funds, either by 
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using funds from other programs to help fund JTPA Title II-A pro-
grams or by using service providers that had alternative funding 
sources. As a result, it is diffi cult to compare the cost of services 
received by JTPA participants across local programs. (p. 5)
Based on their fi ndings from both the quantitative and qualitative 
components of the study, the authors recommended that alternatives 
to the cost measures be explored. The authors note that as a result of 
concern about the unintended impacts of the cost standards, the ETA 
set more lenient cost standards in PY 1988, but they conclude that this 
policy change would not eliminate the disincentive problems in states 
that emphasize exceeding rather than meeting standards. In response to 
the research fi ndings, the NCEP made a number of recommendations 
for changing the statutory provisions of JTPA dealing with performance 
standards. Taking note of the study’s fi ndings regarding the undesir-
able incentives and comparability of cost issues, the commission’s fi rst 
recommendation was that “. . . Section 106(b)(4), which requires the 
Secretary [of Labor] to prescribe performance standards relating gross 
program expenditures to various performance measures, be amended to 
direct that cost-effi ciency be monitored by states.”
In August 1992, the JTPA statute was amended, and the amend-
ments repealed the federal requirement for effi ciency standards and 
prohibited governors from using effi ciency standards in making awards 
to local areas. WIA has no prohibitions against the use of cost stan-
dards, and in response to requests by the OMB, the USDOL currently 
has a contractor exploring the use of cost measures for 11 workforce 
programs administered by the ETA.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
This fi nal section presents conclusions based on the research and 
lessons I suggest for countries about to introduce a performance mea-
surement system for its workforce investment programs. 
Do not confuse performance measurement with program eval-
uation. Performance measurement is used as a management tool, and it 
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cannot and should not be expected to serve as a substitute for program 
evaluation. Performance must be monitored on a continuous basis to 
assess whether key elements of the program are being implemented as 
planned and if immediate program outcomes are consistent with the 
long-term results expected. As a management tool, performance mea-
surement should provide quick feedback on the operation of a program, 
but in most cases, performance measures cannot and do not measure 
program impacts.
There are often good reasons to adjust performance standards 
to take account of program goals, participant characteristics, and 
environmental conditions. Performance is generally a function of 
many factors, so it is likely that programs in different locations will vary 
in important ways that can affect their performance. U.S. programs that 
use adjustment mechanisms refer to the adjustments as “leveling the 
playing fi eld”—an effort to judge programs in different circumstances 
appropriately. When WIA abandoned the statistically based adjustment 
procedures used for the predecessor JTPA program, the states and local 
governments indicated strong dissatisfaction with the new approach.
Programs need not have the same performance measures or 
standards. In the United States, the OMB has attempted to impose 
common measures on all programs with a workforce orientation. 
The programs often differ, however, in signifi cant ways, and there is 
no reason why programs with different participants, activities, and/or 
economic conditions should necessarily have identical measures. For 
example, the Senior Community Service Employment Program, some-
times referred to as the Older Worker program, provides community 
service opportunities to poor older individuals who would like to work. 
It can be debated whether placement in an unsubsidized job is a good 
measure of performance for the program, but it is very unlikely that 
if the entered employment rate is used as a measure that the standard 
should be the same for programs serving customers with fewer barriers 
to employment.
Be cautious in establishing performance measures with large 
rewards and/or sanctions. This is an extremely important lesson from 
the literature on U.S. workforce investment program performance man-
agement research. The literature on performance management for U.S. 
workforce programs clearly indicates that the measures are sometimes 
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only weakly related to outcomes of interest such as program impact and 
that state and local programs can manipulate their data to raise their 
measured performance without actually increasing the value of what 
they do—in short, they spend resources trying to look good instead of 
doing good. Worse, there is strong evidence that programs sometimes 
engage in cream skimming and reduce their services to those most in 
need. Thus, for workforce programs it is wise to avoid “high stakes” 
performance measures if the programs can behave strategically to affect 
their measured performance.
The U.S. experience indicates that too much emphasis on ef-
fi ciency can lead to programs avoiding customers who require 
expensive service strategies and to too much emphasis on less ex-
pensive service strategies. Research on the use of cost measures for 
U.S. workforce investment programs indicates that in the past there 
was widespread agreement that cost measures led to deleterious con-
sequences. Effi ciency is, however, a very important goal, particularly 
when past studies have indicated that only a small fraction of those 
eligible for workforce programs can be served at current budget levels. 
Thus, the current concern about taking cost into consideration when 
measuring the performance of workforce programs is appropriate. The 
question is how best to balance the need to use resources effi ciently 
with the knowledge that placing too much emphasis on cost issues can 
lead to providing the wrong mix of services. I would recommend moni-
toring and discussing effi ciency with those who perform poorly on such 
measures, but given the negative experiences with the use of cost mea-
sures for workforce programs in the United States, I would recommend 
against establishing formal effi ciency measures.
Performance management is still in a formative stage; legisla-
tion should not be overly prescriptive on the measures, standards, 
and incentives. Deliberations on the structure of the performance 
management system should include input by all the relevant stake-
holders. When performance management was fi rst introduced in the 
U.S. workforce investment system, meetings involving representatives 
of states, localities, training providers, academics, and others were held 
over the course of several years before a formal system with rewards 
and sanctions was implemented. This process paved the way for statis-
tical models to be used to adjust for variations across states and local 
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areas. Over time, these work groups explored changes, such as using 
longer-term measures and using administrative data rather than sur-
vey data. The inclusionary process helped lead those involved to have 
a voice in the system and led them to support the resulting system. 
In contrast, when the performance management system was changed 
signifi cantly for the implementation of the WIA program with little if 
any discussion with stakeholders, there was a strong rejection of the 
new system. Performance measures are much less likely to drive per-
formance in the manner intended if those being graded consider the 
system grossly unfair.
Notes
1. The performance management system for JTPA required local programs to 
classify at least 65 percent of participants served as “hard to serve” to qualify for 
performance bonuses.
2. The JTPA Advisory Committee explicitly rejected the idea of dictating process 
to state and local governments: “In the business world, it is now widely accepted 
that the excellent companies defi ne their expected results explicitly, and tightly 
measure performance against them, while allowing their producers to have 
discretion in how they attain those results. We suggest that JTPA emulate this 
model” (JTPA Advisory Committee 1989, p. 27).
3. In the United States, data on employment and earnings for workforce programs 
come from administrative data maintained by states to determine eligibility and 
benefi t levels for unemployment insurance. Such data are not perfect, though, 
as self-employment earnings and off-the-books employment (and sometimes 
employment in other states or for government) are not covered. It is inexpensive 
to use relative to conducting a survey, and it avoids recall issues.
4. During this period the Work Incentive Program (WIN), which provided 
employment and training services to welfare recipients, also had a performance 
management system that distributed some of the funding to states based on their 
success on measures such as welfare grant reductions, the entered employment 
rate, wage rates of WIN participants who obtained jobs, and job retention. See 
U.S. GAO (1982).
5. For a discussion of the JTPA performance management system in its later years, 
see Social Policy Research Associates (1999).
6. See Training and Employment Guidance Letter 17-05, Attachment A. Available 
at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL17-05_AttachA.pdf (accessed on 
October 24, 2009).
7. This section is based on Barnow and Heinrich (2010).
8. See Social Policy Research Associates (2004) and Barnow and King (2005) for a 
discussion of state and local perceptions of performance management under WIA.
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9. For a more in-depth review of the literature on performance standards in workforce 
programs, see Barnow and Smith (2004); most of this section is based on Barnow 
and Smith (2004). For a critical review of the performance management movement, 
see Radin (2006). 
10. The effects of cost standards on services are covered in a later section.
11. A related problem is that performance measures must use short-term postprogram 
earnings to measure performance, but the impact of a program is best measured 
over a longer period. Barnow and Smith (2004) review the literature on the 
relationship between short-term earnings impacts and long-term impacts, and they 
fi nd that most studies fi nd a very weak relationship between the two.
12. See TEIN, 5-93, available at: http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.cfm?DOCN=770.
13. Pascal Courty and Gerald Marschke conducted several studies that verify gaming 
behavior by local programs participating in the National JTPA Study. See Barnow 
and Smith (2004) for a review of these studies.
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